Abstract-Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of a large number of sensor nodes which are deployed without selfdefense capability. The node replication attack is a specific attack mode to WSN and the detection of node replication attacks in WSNs became a fundamental problem. In this paper, we proposed a range-assisted distributed protocol (RADP) to detect node replication attacks in WSNs. The contributions of this work are threefold. First, we showed that the known solutions do not completely meet our requirements. Second, we tried to use wireless ranging information to detect node replication attacks. Third, we proposed a novel protocol for the detection of node replication attacks and Extensive theoretical analysis and experiment verified that it can maintain a high detection probability with low accuracy ranging among nodes.
INTRODUCTION
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) can be deployed in harsh environments to satisfy both military and civil applications, where staff is not easy to stay [1] , [2] . With the development of wireless sensor networks, building a wireless sensor networks requires suitable security protocols [3] . Replication attack (or clone attack) is a common attack mode in WSNs [4] - [5] . Replicas can launch a variety of attacks such as creating a black hole or initiating a wormhole attack [6] - [8] . There are a number of solutions for detecting node replication attacks in wireless sensor networks [9] , [10] .
By analyzing different characteristic data of networks, distributed solutions can be simply divided into three types:
(1) Using time-location claims is a simple resolution for detection of replication attacks in WSNs [11] ;
(2) The other resolution can protect WSN from replication attacks by data encryption [12] ; (3) We can also protect a wireless sensor network by using other characteristic data of networks [13] .
In this paper, a range-assisted detection protocol (RADP) is proposed for detecting node replication attacks in wireless sensor networks without other system information but the distances between nodes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Some important technologies and thesis of WSNs has been introduced in Section II; Section III described the protocol in detail; Section IV is the analysis of the protocol; we show some experiment results in Section V; finally, conclusions and future work to our research are given in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK

A. Assumptions
We assumed that sensor nodes in the network have unique identification which cannot be created (Newsome et al. describe several techniques to prevent the adversary from deploying node with arbitrary IDs [14] ).
Since the main focus of this paper is to provide a solution to detect node replication attack, we assumed that a message fresh mechanism is available, which has been adopted in our protocols to prevent replication attacks in WSNs.
B. Adversary model
Adversaries have the capability of capturing and compromise a limited number of legitimate nodes in our problem settings. Thus, the replicas can easily participate in the network operation without being identified.
C. Notation
To clarity, Table 1 lists the symbols and notations. III. THE RADP
(Definition 1) Categorizing neighbours:
We supposed that node a is a neighbour of node b (that All of its neighbours' information is stored in the neighbour-information table (as show in Table 2 ). By comparing nodes' neighbour-information tables, we can detect replication attacks.
A. LUC: Local Unique Criterion
As shown in Fig.1 , when the replica x′ and node x can detect each other ( x x R ′ − ≤ ), LUC come into force. 
B. NUC: Neighbour Unique Criterion
We can find a node k x when both replica x′ and compromised node x be detected, meanwhile x′ and x are different kind neighbours of k x as shown in Fig .2 . Then NUC would be divided into two symmetrical situations described as the following:
C. GUC: Global Unique Criterion
As shown in Fig.3 
IV. ANALYSIS
A.
1
P : The Probability of LUC
Because nodes are independent uniformly distributed, the distributed probability of i x can be describe as:
According to the definition of LUC ( x x R ′ − ≤ ), the probability of LUC is ( ) ( )
Substituted (1) 
As given in (2), the probability of condition I (or condition I ′ ) can be define as 
The probability of condition II (or condition I I ′ ) can be define as
The probability of situation 1 (or situation 2) is
Similarly, we can obtain ( ) ( )
P ′ is the probability of NUC, it can be defined as
According to Bernoulli equation, we can define the detection probability of NUC as (8). 
Considering that condition I , II and III are independent of each other, so the probability of situation 1 (or situation 2) is ( ) ( ) ( ) (
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Similarly, we can obtain ( ) ( ) ( )
P ′ is the probability of NUC, it can be defined as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3
n P P I P II P III P I P II P III P P R s R P s
According to Bernoulli equation, 3 P can be describe as
In conclusion, we can obtain the total detection probability P as the sum of 1 P , 2 P and 3 P .
A. Simulation Evaluation
To verify the feasibility of the RADP, we ran it in NS2 with 10000 s = The simulation results verified that the RADP is more efficient than the RBDM [15] as shown in Fig.5 . 
B. Real System Evaluation
We run the RADP in a WSN experiment system called GAINS3 as shown in Fig.6 . Our real system experiment result confirmed that the RADP is more suitable for the network comprising of a large number of nodes just like the WSN.
VI. CONCLUSION
The RADP can be used as not only an independent protocol but also a sub-protocol of any other communication protocol. Our theoretical analysis and simulation results demonstrated that the RADP achieves excellent detection performance, low communication and false alarm percentage, without system synchronization time, precise node localization and other additional information.
